ONE HOUR IN THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN.
George and Janet Brown.
It was particularly pleasing to be asked to write about the Battle of Britain as it affected the North East of England, since it gives the opportunity to show that these momentous events were not confined entirely to the South of England or London.
However, research on the subject presented immediate problems. On a local basis, newspapers, both for Newcastle and Northumberland, gave scant information on actual events as they unfolded. While on certain dates they report enemy activity, no specific local targets, or indeed casualties, were acknowledged. It seems that local newspapers had entered into a scheme whereby, in order to maintain the feeling of normality, they concentrated on the reporting of everyday life, leaving the progress of the war to the national newspapers. The most that one reads in the Morpeth Herald or the Northumberland Gazette were statements such as: "..following the raid on the coast last week.." Occasionally, readers would be treated to a photograph of a locally captured German airman being led away for questioning.
Reference to certain more obscure documents bore more fruit, but it is interesting to note that even the official 1941 Royal Air Force propaganda publication on the Battle of Britain mentions no activity north of the Midlands, i.e. Coventry or Birmingham. Any accounts which can be read now, even with the benefit of hindsight, still give varying statistics of aircraft and men involved.
In this year of the 50th Anniversary of the Battle of Britain, the media have once again exposed us to the "glamorous" side of the conflict. We hope that this article will bring out some of the lesser known facts as they affected the region.
Let us set the scene. The retreat from Dunkirk had cost dearly in both lives and morale and although some commentators classed the rescue of troops from the beaches of France as a "victory", clearly it was not. For their part, the Royal Air Force had fought valiantly, losing over 470 fighters alone, but had still managed to bring out some aircraft to reinforce the numbers of Spitfires and Hurricanes already arrayed against the Luftwaffe. The main problem was that Luftflotte 2 and 3 units of the world's largest air force were situated less than an hour's flying time from their main targets in the South East of England. When, in July 1940, Churchill made his stirring speech referring to the invasion threat, and what the consequence could be on both Europe and the United States if it succeeded, the country was clearly in a shocked condition. The Prime Minister's call inspired a fierce determination, not only in our service personnel, but also in our civilian workforce and particularly in the aircraft industry.
While our Radio Direction Finder (RDF, later called RADAR) had been built up since the beginning of the war, even in 1940 the cover, though good, was not sufficient to cope with an enemy whose blitzkrieg tactics had won him bases from Spain to the Arctic. The low level cover was particularly disappointing, but fortuitously this intelligence, as in other more important matters, was not available to the German High Command.
In terms of aircraft, production of fighters under the Ministry of Aircraft Production (M.A.P.) run by Lord Beaverbrook was always well ahead of the estimates by as much as 45%. Indeed, in the run up to August 1940, all aircraft production was as much as 25% over the figures estimated. It might be politic to remind ourselves that while the Spitfire epitomises the dashing glamour of the times with its speed and beauty, the Hurricane outnumbered it by 2 to 1 and was in many ways the better aircraft, with its rugged construction, stable gun platform, and a top speed only 30 m.p.h. lower than its more illustrious stable mate. There was not, therefore, any shortage of aircraft and particularly of fighter aircraft in July/August 1940. They were backed up a reporting and control organisation which, for the period, was adequate, failing only in the ability to predict sufficiently well the height and number of the incoming raids.
To digress, briefly: the timing of the start of the Battle of Britain is interesting. Hitler could have attacked immediately after the fall of France, but he preferred to wait for two reasons. First, he wanted the Luftwaffe to be up to strength on airfields in Holland, Belgium and France, and thus able to mount a more sustained attack, but also because he hoped for a British surrender. Hitler was unaware that a decision had been made as early as May 1940, around the time of the Dunkirk debacle that the fight would continue, hopefully with American help, with the prospect of taking the conflict over Germany by 1941.
Hitler's delay gave Britain precious time in which to train the necessary pilots to replace the 300 lost over France and the Low Countries. Manpower was the problem. It proved to be impossible both to man existing squadrons and also form the new squadrons necessary for the battle ahead. Fortunately, four squadrons formed by the fanatical remnants of the Polish and Czech Air Forces, plus a Canadian squadron, were available in addition to a number of hastily converted pilots from the Fleet Air Arm. By the beginning of August, therefore, Fighter Command as a whole stood as ready as it could be for the challenge.
To return to the main theme: north of a line from Lancaster to Whitby lay the area controlled by 13 Group of Fighter Command, with Sector airfields at Leeming, Usworth, Acklington and Turnhouse (Edinburgh) and subsidiary airfields at Drem near North Berwick and Catterick. Ranged on these was an interesting array of squadrons including several with a history going back to World War One, of which 41 Squadron at Catterick and 72 Squadron at Acklington are examples. In addition, squadrons of the Auxiliary Air Force, already blooded but eager to continue the fight alongside their "full time" colleagues, were 603 City of Edinburgh detached to Aberdeen/Dyce and Montrose, 602 City of Glasgow and 605 County of Warwick both at Drem, and 607 County of Durham at Usworth. All these squadrons used Spitfires or Hurricanes.
The main opposition would come from the Luftwaffe's Luftflotte 5, based in Norway and Denmark, and strategically sited for attacks on the North East of England and Scotland. Their main force comprised Heinkel Ills, Junkers Ju 88s and Dornier Do. 17s bombers, with long range Bf 110 (Messerschmitt) escort fighters and a number of Heinkel 115 Floatplanes normally used for search and rescue work.
German archives give the date of the start of the Battle of Britain as 13th August, but it was actually on the 12th August that the attack began against airfields and Radar stations, particularly in the South, with the express purpose of neutralising the Royal Air Force before any invasion could take place. The significance of the date - the "Glorious Twelfth" - must have been missed by Goering, who lost 36 aircraft shot down on that day! Raids on 12th and 13th August were confined to the South and as far west as Bristol, and resulted in some of the most savage air fighting vet seen. Night raids penetrated as far north as Castle Bromwich, where one of the main Spitfire assembly factories was located. The day and night of the 14th saw sporadic raids over the whole country: the metaphoric calm before the storm.
Thursday, August 15th saw weather suitable for the start of the German onslaught by all three German Luftflotte, who engaged British fighters all along the south and eastern coasts. Here again, the German High Command's supply of intelligence was lacking. They expected no opposition in the areas north of the Wash, being apparently unaware that Air Vice Marshal Dowding rotated fighter squadrons between the fury of the fighting in the South and the relative quiet in the North to allow some rest from battle fatigue. By 11.30 a.m. when battle was joined in the South, 130 aircraft of Luftflotte 5 had been airborne from Stavanger in Norway for over an hour and a half. Their brief was to attack airfields at Dishforth and Usworth with secondary targets at Newcastle, Sunderland and Middlesbrough. Each of the 72 Heinkel 111s carried 3000 lbs of bombs including High Explosives and incendiaries, and were escorted by over 30 twin-engined Bf 110 Messerschmitt fighters.
Ahead of the main enemy force was a contingent of about 20 Heinkel 115 Floatplanes which had taken off even earlier to act as a diversion in order to attract the British fighters from the more northerly airfields. Unusually and, as it turned out, disastrously for the Germans, a minor error in navigation by the leader of the main bombing force took them along the same route as the diversionary raid. Any surprise element was thus lost. 13 Group Radar at Anstruther in Fife, who actually picked up the incoming raid on Radar, assumed that a major attack was being made against Edinburgh, apparently by about thirty enemy aircraft.
Just after midday, faced with the prospect of this major attack, 12 Spitfires of 72 Squadron from Acklington were scrambled, initially to patrol in their base area. At the same time, Oberleutnant Fuchs, leading the German aircraft, realised his error and altered course for his proper targets, while the Floatplanes, their task completed, returned to Norway.
With all indications that a major raid on the North East was now threatening, 72 Squadron were redirected towards the enemy, while Hurricanes of 79 Squadron were brought to readiness at Acklington. (The Order of Battle Fighter Command for 8th August 1940 states, rather oddly, that these aircraft were Spitfires). Twelve Hurricanes of 605 Squadron were scrambled from Drera, and were instructed to climb to the south east to meet the enemy. The Radar site at Ottercops Moss, being off the air for maintenance, was hurriedly brought back into service to facilitate the interception.
The inaccuracies of Radar became important here, and did not supply all the relevant information. With great skill 72 Squadron made contact over the Fame Islands. The Spitfires, to their surprise, were faced not with thirty, but with over ninety enemy. Giving a quick sighting report to 13 Group, the Squadron attacked and, in common with most air battles of the day, the five minutes between 12.30 p.m. and 12.35 p.m. became somewhat confused. Within five minutes, the Hurricanes of 605 Squadron arrived to join the fight just north of Blyth, but already the Heinkel formations had been split up into several smaller groups, and only five Hurricanes made contact initially. By now, 41 Squadron's twelve Spitfires from Catterick and the twelve Hurricanes of 79 Acklington had been scrambled to join the melee. In common with colleagues in the South, the 13 Group Controller, expecting an attack on Acklington, had taken the step of getting units airborne to avoid damage to aircraft on the ground. The running battle passed down the coast towards Newcastle, with the enemy bomber group having now lost at least nine of their number. Two of these were 1/KG26 Heinkel 111 shot down by fighters of 72 and 605 Squadrons, which crashed in the sea at Cresswell, the crew of which, namely, Oberlt. R. Rocj, Uffz. W. Zimmermann, Gefr. E. Kulick, Gefr. G. Machalett, and Flgr. E. Henrichsen were rescued from their dinghy by an Amble fishing boat and captured unhurt. The other was a Messerschmitt BfllO of 2/KG76 which was shot down in combat with fighters of 41, 72 and 79 Squadrons. It crashed in the sea off Northumberland, and of its crew, Fw. K. Ladwein was captured unhurt and Obergefr. K. Lenk was missing presumed killed. Both aircraft were lost in the sea (2). At this stage, the anti-aircraft guns on the coast were brought into use, and were believed to have accounted for at least one of the enemy aircraft. Two further enemy aircraft were accounted for in the Sunderland area, and here we have one of the few references in the local newspaper, which reported "six killed at Seaham Harbour, but one enemy aircraft was brought down" (Newcastle Journal and Chronicle, 16th August, 1940). A train was also hit and destroyed at Seaham. (1)
It is interesting that while the Heinkel Ills of Kg (Kampgeschwader, German Bomber Group) 26 and 65 at least tried to press home the attack as briefed, the Messerchmitt fighters of Jg (Jagdgeschwader) 76 escorting them showed little stomach for the fight, and turned for home by 12.40 p.m., having lost at least 11 aircraft, including their leader who was hit in the first attack by 72 Squadron. This was the only major raid of the battle in the North East and encompassed a period of one very long hour. Claims of losses on both sides were, of course, greatly exaggerated at the time, but the final corrected version was that the German force had lost 21 aircraft while on this occasion the Royal Air Force lost only one: a Hurricane of 605 Squadron, Plt.Off. K. Law force-landing the heavily damaged aircraft near Hartley railway station.
The raid had achieved no tactical result whatsoever, and damage to civilian targets was confined to that at Seaham and some twenty houses damaged in Sunderland (2). The Battle of Britain as it affected the area did not, of course, end there. But the attacks did become more sporadic and were mounted in smaller numbers until the 29th September, when the major part of the overall day air battle came to an end. The date of 15th August certainly should be remembered as the day when the North East joined the South in repelling the fury of a German attack.
People who remember this raid in the North East, and there were few who realised exactly what was happening or its significance at the time, would do well to record their memories in some way. Fifty years later, those of us who do remember the war, and the Battle of Britain in particular, are a dying breed, and we have a finer appreciation of Churchill's statement, when he said of the Royal Air Force: "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few". A month later, ever the master of the powerful and stirring phrase, he urged the British people to "so bear ourselves that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say: 'This was their finest hour'". The Fighter Squadrons of the Royal Air Force had their "finest hour" sooner than the rest of Britain.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Denis Richards and Hilary St. G. Saunders. Royal Air Force 1939-45, Vol.1. H.M.S.O., London, 1953.
REFERENCES
(1) Hammerton, Sir John (Ed). The War Illustrated - Complete Record of the Conflict by Land and Sea and in the Air. Ten Volumes. The Amalgamated Press Ltd., London. Third Vol., July 12th 1940 to January 3rd 1941.
(2) Winston Ramsey (Ed). The Blitz Then and Now. Vol.1. After the Battle, 1987.
